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Abstract 
 
The Portuguese judicial system has attracted considerable criticism in recent years and 
demands for reforms have gained prominence. By using the Data Envelopment Analysis 
technique and focusing on the performance of 223 Portuguese first instance courts during the 
period of 2007 to 2011, this research has found evidence that supports some of this criticism 
and justifies the calls for reforms, better performance and accountability of the judicial system. 
In particular, our results found a sector with considerable scope for improvement with less than 
16 percent of the 223 courts analysed making an efficient use of their resources in each year 
and with only one third of the courts being considered efficient in at least one of the five years 
assessed. Whilst the results suggest that improvement can be achieved with better case 
management, scale factors also seem to play an important role in explaining inefficiency, with 
most of the inefficient courts being smaller than optimal and with smaller courts being, on 
average, less efficient than larger ones. The existence of a statistically significant relationship 
between courts’ efficiency and size was confirmed by the Mann-Whitney test. These results 
indicate considerable scope for improvement and that some of the planned reforms are timely 
and seem well targeted. However, the results also suggest that efficiency increases matching 
peers’ best practices are not enough to sustainably reduce the prevailing judicial backlog and 
length of court proceedings in a considerable number of courts. Major changes in the capacity 
and/or functioning of the Portuguese judicial system might also be required. 
 
 
Keywords: Data envelopment analysis, Portuguese courts, efficiency assessment. 
 
2 
 
1. Introduction 
 
At all levels of government the New Public Management movement has demanded that public 
sector organisations make more effective use of resources and that they be held accountable 
for the services they provide. Courts have not been immune from these demands. Indeed, the 
past few years have witnessed several structural and organisational changes and the 
implementation of mechanisms, procedures and measures aimed at monitoring and improving 
the services provided to court users in many countries, including in Portugal. 
The financial resources allocated by the Portuguese Government to the justice sector have 
increased significantly in recent years, with the exception of the last three years due to the 
stringent austerity measures implemented to address the debt crisis faced by the country. There 
have also been improvements in some courts’ technology, infrastructure and organisational 
functioning. Despite these improvements, aimed at achieving a simpler, quicker, more efficient 
and more humane justice, the public perception is that these objectives are far from being 
reached. This has led the previous and the new Government, elected in 2011, to aim for reform 
in the Portuguese judicial system targeted at improving the efficiency of courts. One of the 
measures to be implemented consists of closing down small courts (i.e. courts with less than 
250 new cases per year), and transferring their caseloads to larger and geographically close 
courts. 
The research documented in this paper has a twofold purpose. Firstly, it aims to determine 
whether there is empirical evidence supporting the public perception that the Portuguese judicial 
system is inefficient. Secondly, it aims to determine whether the decision to close down small 
courts on the grounds that this will generate efficiency gains is supported by substantial 
evidence. As part of this second aim, it is our objective to test the hypothesis that there is a 
relationship between courts’ size and their efficiency. 
In order to achieve these two objectives we use the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
technique and the Mann-Whitney test. The DEA technique will allow us to comparatively assess 
the performance of the Portuguese courts of first instance, determine whether their relative 
performance is high or low, identify the best and worst performers, identify best practices that 
can be used to promote learning and improvement in the system, and explore the effect of scale 
on the efficiency of courts. The Mann-Whitney test [1], which is a distribution free rank order 
statistic, will allow us, in turn, to test whether the relationship between courts’ size and the 
efficiency scores obtained with the DEA technique is statistically significant. Distribution free 
rank order statistics have been recommended for non-parametric analysis of DEA results [2-7]. 
In pursuit of these objectives, the paper is organised as follows. It starts by setting up the 
background of the research and explaining the importance of comparing the relative efficiency 
of the Portuguese courts of first instance. An introduction to the Portuguese judicial system is 
then presented. It then discusses the DEA methodology and its use to assess the efficiency of 
courts. The DEA model used to evaluate the Portuguese courts of first instance at a county 
level and its results are then discussed. The paper finishes by developing recommendations 
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and setting up a research agenda aimed at improving the efficiency of the Portuguese courts of 
first instance. 
 
 
2. The Portuguese judicial system 
 
Portugal is divided, for the purpose of the administration of justice, into judicial districts, judicial 
circuits and judicial counties, and the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic establishes a 
fundamental distinction between civil jurisdiction and administrative jurisdiction. 
In the civil jurisdiction, the focus of our research, the judicial courts are organised into three 
degrees or instances, to each of which corresponds a specific jurisdiction area. The Supreme 
Court of Justice is the superior hierarchical body of the judicial courts. It has a national 
jurisdiction level and is organised into three sections: civil, criminal and social. On a different 
level, there are the Courts of Appeal, which are, as a rule, Courts of Second Instance which 
have a district jurisdiction and are also divided into sections of a civil, criminal and social nature. 
Finally, there are the Courts of First Instance, usually referred to as county courts. The courts of 
first instance are organised according to subject matter, territory, value of the claims brought to 
court and procedure, and may sub-divide into benches.  
As previously mentioned, this study will focus on the civil jurisdiction, which is the one that 
most directly impacts on the economy and on the economic agents [8], and the analysis will be 
carried out at the level of the judicial counties (Comarcas), which are the geographic reference 
for most litigation. Furthermore, throughout the discussion we will use the concept of “efficiency” 
to refer to the ability of the county courts (Tribunais de Comarca) to resolve as many cases as 
possible, given certain levels of staff and other resources.  
Considering that market functioning and economic development depend, to a considerable 
extent, on the quality, efficiency and effectiveness of the judicial courts, evaluation exercises, 
such as the one proposed here, aimed at identifying best practices and at improving the 
functioning and performance of these courts, are fundamental. This need is particularly acute in 
Portugal, where there is widespread perception that the courts manage the cases inefficiently. 
This perception seems to be shared by many politicians, judges, lawyers, litigants, members of 
the public and organisations within the civil society. As a result, litigants and the public at large 
are losing faith in the judicial system's ability to resolve their disputes. The urgent need to revise 
the Portuguese judicial system in order to improve its efficiency was also identified by the 
“troika” of the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund as part of the economic adjustment programme for Portugal [9].  
This need for reform is not only recent, however. Since the end of the nineteen eighties the 
need for reforms in the judicial systems has been recognised and has become part of the 
political agenda in several countries. As discussed by Santos et al. [10], initially the reforms 
focused on finding alternative measures to solve certain types of judicial cases. At a later stage, 
however, the reforms focused on organisational aspects, including the reorganisation of the 
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judicial maps. In this respect, it is possible to find reform programmes initiated in several 
European countries during the nineteen nineties.  
In Portugal, from 2000 onwards, several studies and debates have taken place to discuss 
the general lines of a much needed reform of the judicial system. Specifically, the Portuguese 
Observatory for Justice has published several studies discussing detailed aspects related with 
the management of the system. One of these studies [11] discusses the management of civil 
courts, emphasising the need for reforms in order to achieve greater efficiency. The most 
important recommendations that resulted from this study were: the need to re-evaluate the 
number of judges and support staff allocated to each court based on the volume of cases 
received per year; the need to design new plans of continuous specialised training for workers; 
the need to regularly monitor the performance of the courts, with the internal publication of 
results; the preparation of a manual of good practices; and the need to revise the Code of the 
Civil Process. These recommendations are clearly supportive of research such as that 
discussed in this article, which aims to identify best practices in the administration of justice and, 
through this, promote performance improvement. 
The need to improve the performance of the Portuguese judicial system in general and of 
courts in particular, has gained momentum over the past few years and in August 2008, with the 
publication of specific legislation [12] there began a process of reform aimed at improving the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the judicial institutions. This process was later revised in June 
2012 [13], but the ultimate goals of the reform remained unchanged. The fact that DEA has a 
good record in identifying best practice and in generating useful information to promote an 
efficient and effective use of public resources (e.g. [14, 15]), makes its use in this particular 
context very valuable. Furthermore, considering that DEA allows the assessment of economies 
of scale, this technique will allow us to assess the extent to which the proposed reorganization 
of the existing judicial map with a higher concentration of the judicial services through the 
closure of small courts is supported by evidence. 
 
 
3. DEA and its use to assess the efficiency of courts 
 
In recent years, researchers and practitioners have looked for measures of the efficiency of 
courts and, in some cases, have established comparisons between courts. A general problem in 
carrying out comparative analyses is, however, the definition of a conceptually defensible 
measure of efficiency that can be equitably or fairly applied to different courts. The use of the 
DEA technique is a possible way to deal with such problem, as it allows the inclusion of several 
indicators without requiring the specification of weights. 
DEA is one of the most important and widely used approaches to measure the efficiency of 
homogeneous decision making units (DMUs) and was first proposed by Charnes et al. [16]. 
Below we present the envelopment form and the multiplier form of the DEA problem, with output 
orientation and assuming constant returns to scale (CRS) for DMU 0.   
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In these problems, n is the number of DMUs; s is the number of outputs and m is the number 
of inputs; yr0 is the amount of output r generated by unit 0 and xi0 is the amount of input i used 
by unit 0; ur is the weight of output r and vi is the weight of input i; jλ  
is the intensity variable for 
DMU j reflecting the weight to be attached to each DMU j in forming the efficient benchmark for 
the DMU 0 under analysis; ε is a small non-Archimedean quantity. The score φ obtained from 
the solution to the envelopment model is the maximum rate of proportional expansion in all 
outputs of DMU 0, without decreasing its inputs. The efficiency rate of DMU 0 can be obtained 
by calculating 1/φ, and will be equal to 1 if the DMU is efficient, and smaller than 1 if the DMU is 
inefficient when compared with the other DMUs.  
The DEA output oriented model with variable returns to scale (VRS), proposed by Banker et 
al. [17], is similar to the CRS version but includes the convexity restriction in the envelopment 
form: 1
1
=∑
=
n
j
jλ . The introduction of this additional restriction will produce a scale variable 
(unrestricted in sign), which is added to the objective function and to the first set of restrictions 
of the dual (multiplier) formulation. If DMU 0 is efficient under the VRS assumption, whether 
increasing, constant or decreasing returns to scale are present depends on whether the scale 
variable assumes a negative, null or positive value, respectively, in the optimal solution for the 
dual problem. Furthermore, if we run the DEA model under the CRS and VRS assumptions, we 
can obtain a measure of scale efficiency by dividing the score obtained under the CRS 
assumption by the score obtained under the VRS assumption. If this ratio is equal to one, the 
DMU is scale efficient, but if it is smaller than one the DMU is scale inefficient. 
Several methodological developments have been proposed regarding the DEA technique 
and Liu et al. [18] have identified some of the most influential ones through a citation based 
survey of the DEA literature. One such development relates to the use of weight restrictions to 
incorporate value judgements in the DEA analysis [19], and several methodologies have been 
proposed. Weight restrictions can be imposed on both 'pure weights' and 'virtual weights'. 'Pure 
weights' are the variables in the multiplier version of the mathematical problem and represent 
the values multiplied by each input and by each output in order to form the optimal efficiency 
score (the ratio of weighted outputs to inputs). The 'pure weights' represent marginal rates of 
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substitution of the inputs and the outputs. Given that the 'pure weights' depend on the unit of 
measurement of each input and output, they cannot be directly interpreted as the relative 
contribution of each input and output to the efficiency score. In order to assess the relative 
contribution of each input and output, it is necessary to use the values of the 'virtual weights', 
which result from the product of the 'pure weight' by the value of the respective input and output. 
The reader interested in the methodologies that have been proposed to define weight 
restrictions and in other developments in the DEA literature is referred to Cook and Seiford [20] 
and Cooper et al. [21,22].  
Since its advent in 1978, DEA has been extensively applied in many sectors including 
education, finance, agriculture, sports, marketing and manufacturing, to name just a few. For a 
recent survey on DEA applications the reader is referred to Liu et al. [23]. There have also been 
some documented applications of DEA in the justice area. For example, it has been used to 
assess the efficiency of police forces [24-28] and prosecutor offices [29], and to determine the 
relationship between efficiency of justice services and salaries of judges in European countries 
[30].  
Other methods can also be used to analyse efficiency in this context, such as Stochastic 
Frontier Analysis (SFA). For a recent review of old and new frontier methods for efficiency 
measurement, the reader is referred to Krüger [31]. However, when compared with DEA, SFA 
has the disadvantage of requiring the specification of the functional form that allows the 
transformation of inputs into outputs. Such specification can be a challenge in this context and a 
nonparametric technique can be preferable. The advantages of using DEA to assess the 
efficiency of judicial entities, comparative to other methods, have also been discussed [32]. 
However, the use of DEA in this area is still scarce. To the best of our knowledge there are only 
seven studies published in international journals which have modelled and analysed the 
performance of courts by means of DEA. 
The pioneering work on the use of DEA in this area is that of Lewin et al. [32], which 
analyses the efficiency of 30 judicial districts in North Carolina, containing 100 criminal superior 
courts. The model adopted used two outputs (number of dispositions and number of cases 
pending less than 90 days) and five inputs; two of these inputs were controllable (days of court 
held and number of district attorneys and assistants) and the remaining three were exogenous 
and, therefore, non-controllable (size of the caseload, number of misdemeanours in the 
caseload and size of the white population). Although this model can be criticised on the grounds 
of aggregating the services of the courts too much and not taking account of the heterogeneity 
between cases, it still provided very valuable insights. In particular, the study found a fairly 
inefficient sector both at the district and county levels of analysis.  
A decade later, Kittelsen and Førsund [33] also made an important contribution to this area. 
In particular, they assessed the efficiency of 107 district courts in Norway by pooling the 
observations for the period 1983 to 1988 and using the average value over the six years as the 
basic observation. They used a DEA model with two inputs and seven outputs aimed at 
suggesting ways of improving the efficiency of the Norwegian district courts. Contrarily to the 
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previous work, Kittelsen and Førsund [33] did not acknowledge explicitly in their model that the 
efficiency of the courts might be influenced by exogenous factors as they have only considered 
the workforce of courts (number of posts as judges and number of office staff) as an input. 
However, they did acknowledge that the cases judged by the courts are neither homogenous in 
relative labour intensities nor in total time required. Therefore, the outputs of their model 
followed the conventional functional division of cases used in the judiciary service. To this 
purpose, seven major categories of cases were considered: Civil cases; B-cases; Examination 
and summary jurisdiction cases; Ordinary criminal cases; Registry cases; Cases of duress; 
Probate and bankruptcy cases. Based on this model, their analysis found a fairly efficient court 
sector, with the average technical efficiency for all courts above 90%. Furthermore, their study 
found that most of the inefficiency was scale inefficiency with inefficient courts, on average, 
being smaller than optimal. Contrary to the work of Lewin et al. [32], they also performed a 
dynamic analysis by assessing productivity changes in the sector. Using the Malmquist 
Productivity Index (MPI), they found that the improvement for the six year period was rather 
weak at about 6%, with 4% due to catching up and 2% due to technology shift. 
Tulkens [34] has also evaluated productive efficiency in the provision of judicial services by 
means of the DEA technique. In particular, he compared the productive efficiency of the 187 
Belgian justice of the peace courts, which have a single judge dealing with cases of minor 
monetary value and arising within a well-defined geographical area called a "canton". The DEA 
model adopted had only one input (number of clerks) and three outputs (number of settled civil 
and commercial cases, number of family arbitration sessions held and number of minor offense 
cases settled). Based on the free disposal hull measure of productive efficiency and using data 
from 1983 to 1985 he found that the percentage of inefficient courts was in the range of 82% to 
87%. In spite of having found an inefficient court sector, Tulkens concluded that only 35% of the 
prevailing judicial backlog in Belgian justice of peace courts could be reduced by productivity 
increases that would match peers' best practice. Personnel increases thus seemed to be 
justified. 
Pedraja-Chaparro and Salinas-Jiménez [35], have also added to this body of literature by 
documenting the use of DEA to assess the efficiency of the Administrative Litigation Division of 
the Spanish high courts, having analysed 21 units for the year 1991. Their selection of inputs 
(number of judges and number of office staff) is very similar to that of Kittelsen and Førsund 
[29]. However, they aggregated the services provided by the high courts into two broad 
categories of outputs: cases resolved through the full legal process and other resolved cases 
(e.g. conciliations, withdrawals, dismissals, etc.), which might be criticised on the grounds of not 
taking into account the heterogeneity between cases. They found considerable scope for 
improvement in the sector as only 23.8% of the 21 high courts analysed were technically 
efficient and as the average efficiency of the courts was 77.4%. 
Two other studies on the use of DEA to assess the efficiency of courts are those of 
Schneider [36] and Yeung and Azevedo [37]. The former study aimed to explore the links 
between the judicial organisation and the courts performance, by using data from 9 German 
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labour courts of appeal over the period 1980–1998. The main difference in Schneider’s DEA 
model in comparison with previous ones is that he included a measure of judicial lawmaking in 
the set of outputs. He obtained an average efficiency score of 88.8% and found evidence that 
promotion probabilities have a negative impact on the DEA scores. In particular, he found that 
the higher the average or maximum probability of promotion, the lower court productivity and 
the more often decisions are reversed by the federal labour court. The latter study used DEA to 
measure the efficiency of the 27 Brazilian state courts. Yeung and Azevedo [37] used two inputs 
(i.e. the number of judges and the number of auxiliary staff) and two outputs (i.e. the number of 
adjudications in the first- and second-degree courts) having found considerable efficiency 
variations across courts and that the most efficient courts were those that exhibited better 
internal management and organisation. Like some of the previous studies, the fact that Yeung 
and Azevedo did not distinguish the content, and therefore, the complexity of the adjudicated 
lawsuit cases can be pointed as an important limitation. 
The other, and most recent study in this area, was conducted by Ferrandino [38], who used 
DEA to assess the efficiency of Florida’s circuit courts during the period of 1993 to 2008. This 
study used the total number of judges per circuit as the only input measure, and used as output 
the dispositions for the entire circuits (criminal, civil, and family courts), having found that only 3 
out of 300 Florida circuit courts were technically efficient and that their efficiency deteriorated 
over time. The fact that both the inputs and outputs were aggregated at such a high level has, 
however, impacted significantly on the results and poses considerable limitations on the insights 
that can be drawn from the analysis. 
These studies have improved our understanding of the potential of using DEA to assess the 
efficiency of courts, however more research is still required. In particular, it is fundamental to 
extend the number of DEA applications in this specific context and develop models that account 
for the heterogeneity and complexity of cases to a greater extent. Considering the remarkable 
variety of cases that can be brought to courts, aggregating these cases into a few broad 
categories, as has been done by previous research, is likely to introduce bias into the 
assessment and result in missing some valuable insights for learning and improvement. In the 
next section we discuss this issue in further detail and propose a model which explicitly 
considers the different nature and complexity of cases, providing the foundations for fairer 
comparisons of courts. In so doing, this research expands the theory and the available empirical 
applications reported in the literature, increasing our understanding of the value of the DEA 
technique in this particular context.  
Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge, there are no published studies on the use of DEA 
to evaluate the relative efficiency of the Portuguese judicial system. Frameworks have been 
proposed to assess the performance of the Portuguese courts [8,39]. However, these 
frameworks have tended to rely on the use of multiple performance indicators detailing different 
aspects of the performance of the courts. Whilst valuable, it is well known that the use of 
multiple performance measures or ratios alone presents strong limitations in carrying out 
comparative analyses of courts, as some courts may rank higher on certain indicators, while 
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lower according to others, making it difficult to derive a single aggregate measure of the relative 
performance of each of the courts. This problem could be addressed if it was possible to reach 
an agreement on the relative importance of the various performance indicators. This is, 
however, seldom the case as the importance of each indicator is dependent upon the 
perspective taken and dependent upon the priorities of the court under evaluation. In contrast to 
the use of multiple indicators, ratio analyses and parametric frontier estimation approaches, the 
DEA technique allows the calculation of a single aggregate measure of relative efficiency, 
handles multiple input and output factors, does not require a priori weights or prices and allows 
adjustment for non-controllable factors. These characteristics make the DEA technique a useful 
and relevant approach to perform efficiency analyses in the judicial context. Therefore, by 
aiming to reach the objectives mentioned above, this paper makes an important contribution to 
the literature in this area, and is of interest to both policy makers and researchers. 
 
 
4. The relative efficiency of the Portuguese courts of first instance 
 
4.1. The DEA model  
 
The identification and selection of appropriate input and output variables is a fundamental step 
in the DEA analysis. Nataraja and Johnson [40] compare some of the most widely-used 
approaches to guide variable specification in DEA. The objective of the different approaches is 
to select a set of inputs and outputs that are policy relevant and for which a significant statistical 
relationship exists. In the context of the courts of first instance the outputs are mainly related to 
the level of services they provide to the litigants and the inputs are related to the level of 
resources used for that purpose. When using DEA to assess the performance of the courts of 
first instance it is assumed that inputs are to be minimised or outputs maximised.  
In the context of any judicial system, it is reasonable to assume that the resolution of 
disputes is the basic service provided by the courts of first instance. Considering that dispute 
resolution is predominantly labour intensive, and that the labour cost per finished case can 
reach as much as 90% of the total cost per case [35], staff is undoubtedly the main input in the 
courts of first instance production/resolution process. Given the different work contents and 
roles that are played by the staff at the courts of first instance, we decided to use two input 
variables capturing the two main categories of staff that operate at a court level: judges (input 1) 
and support staff (input 2). This definition of inputs is consistent with previous research [30, 
33,35,37]. 
Regarding the output variables, the output of a court of first instance in terms of dispute 
resolution can be captured by the number of cases finished during a specific period. 
Considering the variety of court cases that exists, previous research has grouped these cases 
into a few broad categories. This procedure might ensure discrimination in the DEA results and 
addresses some of the heterogeneity between cases, however, it does not fully account for the 
difference in complexity and work content of different cases and, consequently, can introduce 
bias in the performance assessment of courts. This fact can be easily illustrated by using data 
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from 2011, which is the most recent year for which we have data available for the Portuguese 
courts of first instance.  
If we analyse the average time taken by the Portuguese courts to resolve a case in each of 
the five major procedural areas, we conclude that it took them on average 29 months to resolve 
a civil justice case, 9 months to resolve a criminal justice case, 13 months to resolve a labour 
justice case, 7 months to resolve a labour-criminal justice case and 13 months to resolve a 
family justice case. This clearly suggests that, on average, civil justice cases are more complex 
or at least more time consuming than the cases included in the other four procedural areas. 
Therefore, it seems that an acceptable way to proceed with the DEA analysis would be to define 
two (e.g. civil justice cases and other cases) or at most five broad categories of cases, 
corresponding to each of the five procedural areas. However, when we take a closer look at the 
types of court procedures included in each procedural area, and at the types of court 
proceedings within each type of procedure (please see Table A.1 in Appendix A), it becomes 
obvious that the level of aggregation suggested above would be inappropriate.   
For instance, within the civil justice procedural area we have 5 different types of procedures 
and at least 17 different types of proceedings, with some taking on average 2 months to be 
resolved, whereas others take as long as 100 months to finish. This variety in the complexity of 
cases also occurs in the other procedural areas and allows us to conclude that the aggregation 
of cases into procedural areas, or even into the different types of procedures can be 
inappropriate in two different ways. Firstly, it can bias the comparative analysis of courts by 
penalising those that have more complex cases in their caseloads, as these take longer to 
conclude and, therefore, lead to a smaller number of finished cases per year. Secondly, it 
prevents decision makers gaining deep insights into the different case management strategies 
of each court as data would be aggregated at a too-high level. The insights derived from the 
identification and analysis of the optimal weight structure chosen by courts are considerably 
richer when the results allow decision makers to understand how each court has distributed the 
weights amongst the different types of proceedings, and in this way identify those proceedings 
that each court is managing most efficiently. 
In order to address these limitations, we suggest the aggregation of cases by type of 
proceeding rather than by type of procedure or procedural area. This will account for the 
heterogeneity of cases to a much greater extent than has been done by previous studies. The 
model we propose to compare the performance of the Portuguese courts of first instance has, 
therefore, 2 inputs and 43 output variables, the latter corresponding to the number of cases 
finished by the first instance courts under analysis during the period 2007-2011 for each one of 
the different types of proceedings (please see the third column of Table A.1 in Appendix A). 
Although this model is in accordance with the guideline proposed by Friedman and Sinuany-
Stern [41], which states that the total number of inputs and outputs should be less than one third 
of the number of DMUs in the analysis, it is important to bear in mind that the greater the 
number of variables in a DEA model, the higher the risk of low discrimination in the results. 
Therefore, considering that the number of types of proceedings handled by the Portuguese 
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courts is very high, in order to ensure meaningful DEA results it is important to impose 
restrictions on the weights that courts can give to each type of proceeding. Unless weight 
restrictions are imposed, there is a high risk of low discrimination and unrealistic results as 
some courts might be shown as efficient just because they have the highest resolution rate of a 
particular type of proceeding per member of staff compared to other courts, although these 
proceedings might represent a very small fraction of the total caseload of the courts.  
The procedure we propose to define meaningful weight restrictions and to address the issue 
above consists of defining production trade-offs capturing the complexity of the different types of 
proceedings. As emphasised by Podinovsky [42], the use of realistic production trade-offs 
improves the discrimination of the results and at the same time preserves the traditional 
meaning of efficiency as a radial improvement factor for inputs and outputs. To this effect, we 
use the average duration taken by all courts to resolve a particular type of proceeding as a 
proxy of its complexity. That is to say that a proceeding i lasting on average 24 months to 
conclusion is assumed to be more complex than a proceeding j lasting on average say, 18 
months. Therefore, we assume that no extra resources can be claimed by courts if proceedings 
type i are reduced by n and proceedings type j are increased by n. 
The weight restrictions (1) to (42) shown in Appendix B express the trade-offs between the 
different types of proceedings resolved in 2011 and were defined by using information regarding 
the average duration of each case as shown in the last column of Table A.1 in Appendix A. For 
example, restriction (1) u4 – u21 ≥ 0 captures the fact that the proceedings “common 
enforcement (before 15th September 2003)” (O4) are more complex than the proceedings 
“transgression” (O21), as the former take on average 100 months to solve and the latter take on 
average 79 months. The same rationale was used for the other 41 weight restrictions and for 
the other four years under analysis. The weight restrictions were developed following the 
approach proposed by Podinovski [42], and represent realistic production trade-offs between 
the different types of proceedings, whilst still allowing enough flexibility to the courts in the 
choice of weights. 
Restriction (43) v1 – v2 ≥ 0 aims, in turn, to establish meaningful production trade-offs 
between the two inputs. In particular, this restriction states that if the number of support staff 
decreases by one and the number of judges increases by one, there should be no detriment to 
the level of finished cases. We are assuming that the work carried out by a support staff 
member could also be carried out by a judge, but the reverse is not true. This assumption is 
justified by the description in the law of the work carried out by a judge and by a member of the 
support staff. Whilst a judge is supposed to undertake specialised judicial work [43], a support 
staff member is supposed to undertake general secretarial work, such as receiving applications,  
giving information and providing secretarial support during audiences [44]. 
In addition to the controllable inputs and outputs, there are occasions where it might be 
important to consider non-discretionary variables in order to take into account and to adjust for 
differences in the operating environment among court jurisdictions. Non-controllable inputs are 
not minimised as non-controllable outputs are not maximised. They are included in the DEA 
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models just to ensure comparable technologies. In this particular context, the DEA technique 
can handle, for example, factors such as the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of 
court jurisdictions (e.g. population size, income, education), which may affect court outputs, but 
over which courts have no control. Some of these factors may, indeed, affect the complexity of 
the cases received by each court. However, considering that we have disaggregated the output 
variables to account for the different types of proceedings and have included weight restrictions 
to account for the complexity of the different types of cases, the risk of leaving out relevant 
factors is minimised.  
Some previous studies [32,36] have used the courts’ caseload as a non-discretionary input. 
The caseload is the sum of the number of filed cases during the year and the number of 
pending cases at the beginning of that year, being an important variable to account for some of 
the non-controllable factors mentioned previously. It might also be important to consider the 
caseload because courts cannot provide services unless lawsuits are filed. In the case of the 
Portuguese courts of first instance, we believe that it is not appropriate to use the caseload as 
an input for two main reasons. Firstly, all courts have a caseload level much higher than the 
level of cases they are able to finish each year. For example, in 2011, which is the most recent 
year for which we have data, the number of cases completed by each of the Portuguese courts 
of first instance represented, on average, only 33% of their caseload levels. Even the court that 
resolved a higher proportion of pending cases in 2011 only managed to resolve 55 percent of its 
caseload. This suggests, therefore, that the level of services the courts provide is not 
significantly restricted by their caseload levels. Secondly, the caseload levels are mostly a result 
of lack of resources and/or poor performance of courts in previous years, which means that 
including them in the analysis, could bias the results. In particular it could end up showing some 
courts being weakly efficient when compared to others not because they finished fewer cases in 
a particular year, but because they had higher caseload levels.   
Although the caseload and other variables might be used to explain judicial systems’ 
efficiency [45], it is important to emphasise that the set of variables chosen for our DEA analysis 
is widely accepted in the literature, and accurately reflects the productive activity of the 
Portuguese courts of first instance.  
 
 
4.2. Data and results 
 
The data used in this study refers to the activity of 223 different courts of first instance operating 
in at least one year from 2007 to 2011. These years are the last five years for which we have 
comparable data available and it was obtained from the website of the Portuguese Directorate-
General for Justice Policy (http://www.dgpj.mj.pt). Twenty two of the first instance courts were 
excluded from at least one of the years assessed because they were considered outliers.  
Outliers were detected by following the procedure proposed by Banker and Gifford [46] and 
using a pre-specified screen level of 1.2, which has proven effective in identifying those 
observations that are more likely to be contaminated with noise [47]. For alternative procedures 
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to detect outliers the reader is referred to, for example, Simar [48] and Bellini [49]. Table 1 
presents the summary statistics regarding the 45 variables used in the DEA model as well as 
the Pearson correlation coefficients between the variables total staff and each one of the 
different types of proceedings handled and finished by the first instance courts during 2007 to 
2011.  
 
Table 1 - Summary statistics and correlation coefficients of the variables used in the DEA model for 
the Portuguese courts of first instance – Years 2007 to 2011 
 
 Year 2011  Average 2007-2011 
 Average 
St 
Dev 
Max Min 
 
Average 
St 
Dev 
Max Min 
Correlation 
coefficient
 
INPUTS:           
   I1: Judges 6.3 6.2 29 1  6.3 7.3 110 1   
   I2: Support staff 18.8 17.7 76 3  20.0 22.1 310 3   
                    
OUTPUTS:                    
   O1: Common civil declaratory actions  246.8 338.4 2901 9  264.6 350.1 3606 9 0.88 
   O2: Declaratory actions (DL.108/2006)  8.0 68.7 707 0  4.8 51.5 715 0 0.17 
   O3: Common enforcement 561.9 680.4 3476 22  453.8 580.3 6233 14 0.83 
   O4: Common enforcement (< 15-Sep-2003) 19.4 31.9 240 0  49.4 102.9 1760 0 0.54 
   O5: Special enforcement 3.0 6.2 42 0  2.7 6.2 94 0 0.69 
   O6: Enforcement of pecuniary obligation 0.2 1.5 18 0  1.3 5.0 74 0 0.36 
   O7: Divorce and separation 23.4 29.4 149 0  24.0 34.7 515 0 0.7 
   O8: Inventory 24.2 22.3 124 0  25.4 25.5 376 0 0.74 
   O9: Corporate reorganisation/bankruptcy 36.4 50.6 312 0  19.8 35.1 363 0 0.69 
   O10: Other special actions 26.3 30.1 181 0  24.4 29.4 370 0 0.87 
   O11: Interim means of protection (civil justice) 31.6 38.1 199 0  34.8 45.5 455 0 0.89 
   O12: European procedure of injunction 0.02 0.2 3 0  0.003 0.1 3 0 0.06 
   O13: Embargos (civil justice) 48.2 62.2 347 0  39.4 54.2 590 0 0.81 
   O14: Qualification heirs 8.0 9.5 50 0  7.3 8.7 75 0 0.82 
   O15: Fiscal foreclosure (claiming credits)  64.8 78.8 506 0  47.3 65.6 774 0 0.74 
   O16: Service judicial notice 25.0 42.2 315 0  22.5 41.0 452 0 0.75 
   O17: Other civil justice proceedings 52.1 76.4 457 0  46.2 68.5 1008 0 0.77 
   O18: Common criminal proceedings 210.0 234.0 1235 13  234.3 290.4 2657 0 0.89 
   O19: Special criminal proceedings 118.9 129.3 789 0  135.4 173.9 1851 0 0.85 
   O20: Misdemeanour (criminal justice) 28.3 46.1 327 0  28.3 44.2 377 0 0.68 
   O21: Transgression 0.1 0.4 4 0  5.4 58.2 1059 0 0.21 
   O22: Legal accumulation 0 0 0 0  0.01 0.3 10 0 0.42 
   O23: Bail 0.2 1.3 15 0  0.3 1.4 20 0 0.37 
   O24: Economic bail 0 0 0 0  0.004 0.1 4 0 0.05 
   O25: Questioning aliens 3.3 9.5 86 0  5.5 14.9 179 0 0.54 
   O26: Judicial expulsion (DL 244/98) 0.2 2.4 33 0  0.2 2.5 47 0 0.07 
   O27: Hospitalisation order (judicial confirmation) 2.8 10.8 103 0  3.4 14.4 187 0 0.4 
   O28: Enforcement foreign sentence 0 0 0 0  0.003 0.1 3 0 0.05 
   O29: Habeas Corpus 0.1 0.5 5 0  0.1 0.7 9 0 0.15 
   O30: Good conduct bond 0.03 0.3 3 0  2.4 6.7 66 0 0.33 
   O31: Banking secrecy breach incident 1.7 5.1 45 0  1.8 7.2 131 0 0.67 
   O32: Enforcement accessory penalty 0 0 0 0  0.004 0.1 4 0 0 
   O33: Hospitalisation order 4.6 8.1 60 0  4.6 8.6 78 0 0.7 
   O34: Third party rights incident (DL15/93) 0 0 0 0  0.03 0.4 6 0 0.04 
   O35: Other criminal justice proceedings 0.6 2.2 11 0  0.8 3.6 62 0 0.27 
   O36: Common labour declaratory actions 0.8 4.9 51 0  1.8 24.3 658 0 0.57 
   O37: Labour enforcement 0.1 1.2 16 0  0.3 4.7 144 0 0.48 
   O38: Work accident/occupational disease 1.8 16.9 231 0  4.2 62.3 1446 0 0.59 
   O39: Other special actions (labour justice) 0.2 1.7 18 0  0.2 3.4 103 0 0.43 
   O40: Interim means of protection (labour justice) 0 0 0 0  0.1 1.3 34 0 0.57 
   O41: Embargos (labour justice) 0.02 0.2 3 0  0.003 0.1 3 0 0.06 
   O42: Misdemeanours (labour criminal justice) 0.1 1.3 18 0  0.3 3.5 70 0 0.32 
   O43: Non-specified proceedings (family justice)  90.4 110.1 563 0  92.9 155.8 2816 0 0.72 
 
During 2007 to 2011 the first instance courts analysed had an average total caseload of 
989,644 cases per year, with the highest level being observed in 2011 (1,032,220 cases) and 
the lowest in 2008 (944,359 cases). From these cases, the first instance courts were able to 
finish only about a third of them, causing a substantial backlog of cases for the following years. 
This, together with the fact that the number of new cases per year has been consistently higher 
than the number of cases finished, signals an unsustainable situation. 
From the analysis of the data, and using 2011 as an example, it is also possible to observe 
that the courts compared in this study vary considerably in size ranging from a caseload of 349 
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to one of 31,925 cases, and employing from 5 to 101 members of staff, including judges and 
other support personnel. The total number of cases resolved also varied considerably across 
courts, from a minimum of 111 to a maximum of 9,145 cases. From Table 1 we can also confirm 
that in the five-year period not all courts handled and finished all types of proceedings. The 
most frequent types of proceedings resolved by the Portuguese courts of first instance during 
2007 to 2011 were the “common enforcement” (O3) and the “common civil declaratory actions” 
(O1) belonging to the civil procedural area, and the “common proceedings” (O18) belonging to 
the criminal procedural area. Together, these three types of proceedings account for around 
60% of the total amount of proceedings finished during 2007 to 2011. On the opposite side, the 
proceedings “European procedure of injunction” (O12), “embargos (labour justice)” (O12) and 
“enforcement of foreign sentence” (O28) are the less frequent ones. Although these and some 
other types of proceedings account for a small proportion of the cases handled by the 
Portuguese courts, excluding them from the analysis or pooling them in a “residual” category 
would cause loss of important information regarding case management strategies and/or 
exogenous demand factors and would likely penalise some of the courts that use time and 
resources handling these proceedings. 
In order to achieve our first objective, and determine the extent to which the empirical 
evidence supports the public perception that the Portuguese judicial system has considerable 
scope for improvement in terms of efficiency, we ran an output oriented DEA model for each of 
the five years under analysis using the PIM DEA software [50]. The results were then confirmed 
by an independent researcher using the EMS software [51]. The output orientation is justified by 
reasoning that the Portuguese courts have a very large backlog of cases and therefore should 
aim to increase the resolution of cases, given the existing staff levels. Furthermore, we have 
used an assumption of variable returns to scale as proposed by Banker et al. [17]. This 
assumption is justified because the courts vary considerably in size, and size can be an 
important factor in determining the cost structure and the production of services by courts [52]. 
As discussed previously, a set of weight restrictions was also imposed in order to ensure 
meaningful results. Table 2 presents the summary of the results obtained.   
  
Table 2 – Summary statistics of the efficiency results for the period 2007 to 2011 
 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Average 
2007-2011 
Number of courts assessed  213 211 197 191 196 201.6 
Number of efficient courts  14 23 22 28 30 23.4 
Percentage of efficient courts  6.6% 10.9% 11.2% 14.7% 15.3% 11.6% 
Number of courts with an  
   efficiency score below average 
 113 112 117 103 98 108.6 
Percentage of courts with an 
   efficiency score below average 
 53.1% 53.1% 59.4% 53.9% 50.0% 53.9% 
        
Efficiency scores:        
      Average  62.0% 72.6% 64.7% 73.0% 73.6% 69.1% 
      St Dev  19.4% 16.9% 19.5% 18.4% 19.6% 18.7% 
      Maximum  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%  
      Minimum  12.7% 31.4% 21.1% 24.0% 30.4%  
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The results on Table 2 largely confirm the perception that inefficiency is a major problem of 
the Portuguese first instance courts and that efficiency varies significantly across the country. 
From Table 2 we can observe that the number of courts making an efficient use of resources in 
the five-year period is very low, although the percentage of efficient courts has increased over 
the years. The fact that only 15.3% of the first instance courts assessed in 2011 were classified 
as technically efficient, that 50.0% of the inefficient courts achieved efficiency scores below 
average and that the average efficiency score was 73.6% suggests significant scope for 
improvement in the number of cases resolved given the local demands and the current levels of 
resources provided to the courts. This is particularly relevant as 2011 is simultaneously the most 
recent year for which we have data available and when the first instance courts achieved their 
best performance. Table 2 also indicates that efficiency varies considerably across the country 
as the standard deviation associated with the efficiency of the courts ranges from 16.9% to 
19.6% in the five years analysed. 
Although several factors might help explain the differences in the efficiency of the courts, the 
results above suggest that better case management, based on the sharing of best practices, 
has the potential to significantly improve the efficiency levels of the Portuguese courts of first 
instance. Table 3 shows some of the courts with the greatest scope for improvement and some 
of the most robust benchmarks.  
 
Table 3 – Courts with the greatest improvement potential and most robust benchmarks 
 
Courts with the greatest improvement potential  Courts that can best serve as models for improvement
(1)
 
Court 
Average 
PTE
(2) 
Score 
2007-11 
(%) 
 
St Dev 
(%) 
 
 
 
Court 
 
 
Average 
PTE 
Score 
2007-11 
(%) 
Number of 
years court  
i  was 
considered 
efficient 
Total number 
of times court 
i was 
considered 
as a 
benchmark 
Barreiro 33.8 5.2  Leiria 100.0 5 307 
Monchique 34.4 19.5  Cadaval 100.0 4 173 
S. Cruz Graciosa 39.3 11.0  Matosinhos 100.0 5 56 
Alvaiázere 41.3 12.4  Amares 98.9 3 49 
Almeida 41.7 7.6  Arouca 98.3 4 42 
Vila do Porto 43.0 9.2  Cascais 98.1 4 27 
Portimão 43.1 7.3  Paços Ferreira 95.9 3 80 
Idanha-a-Nova 43.3 9.1  Lousada 94.4 3 70 
Vinhais 43.8 8.1  Cinfães 92.7 3 100 
Lamego 44.0 8.1  F. Cast. Rodrigo 92.2 4 102 
 Note: 1Although several other courts have been identified as technically efficient in at least one of the years analysed and serve as 
benchmark for several courts, in Table 3 we show only those that obtained the highest average efficiency score during the five-year 
period and that were considered efficient in at least 3 out of the 5 years analysed. 2PTE: Pure Technical Efficiency. 
 
As displayed in Table 3, Barreiro’s court displayed the lowest average efficiency score within 
the courts assessed. For instance, from a caseload of 9,977 cases in 2011, its 23 judges and 56 
support staff were able to complete only 2,572 cases, which is less than 26% of the caseload. 
The poor performance results of this court can be understood in more detail when we compare 
its productivity levels with the productivity levels of its peers. 
Figure 1 displays the number of proceedings finished in 2011 per judge (radar graphs on the 
left) and per support staff (radar graphs on the right) in Barreiro’s court as a percentage of the 
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proceedings finished by its benchmarks (i.e. the first instance courts in Leiria and Paços de 
Ferreira). Only the types of proceedings handled by at least one of the courts under comparison 
and representing one or more percent of the overall number of cases resolved in 2011 by these 
courts are represented in Figure 1.  
As can be seen, the number of the different types of proceedings finished per judge and per 
support staff member in Barreiro’s court is much smaller than in Leiria and Paços de Ferreira’ 
courts. The only types of proceedings where the productivity of the judges and of the support 
staff in Barreiro’s court outperforms the performance of one of its benchmarks is for “service 
judicial notice” proceedings (O16) and “misdemeanour” proceedings (O20), where the staff in the 
court of Barreiro show better performance than the staff in the court of Paços de Ferreira. As 
these two types of proceedings account for only 3.2% of the total cases finished by the 3 courts 
compared and they are not as complex as some of the others, the better productivity of the 
judges and support staff in handling these proceedings in Barreiro’s court compared to Paços 
de Ferreira, is not enough to compensate for the much poorer results regarding the other types 
of proceedings. 
 
Figure 1 – Comparing the efficiency of Barreiro’s court with the efficiency of its peers 
  
 
 
 
Table 3 also shows those courts with the most robust performances and which can represent 
important platforms for learning, namely: Leiria, Cadaval, Matosinhos, Amares, Arouca, 
Cascais, Paços de Ferreira, Lousada, Cinfães and Figueira Castelo Rodrigo. Each of these 10 
courts was considered efficient in at least three of the five years assessed and obtained an 
average efficiency score above 92%. The only courts that were considered technically efficient 
in the five consecutive years were the ones in Leiria and Matosinhos. It is also worth noting that 
the number of courts for which Leiria is a benchmark has increased considerably over the 
years. For instance, 8.0% of the inefficient courts identified Leiria as a peer in 2007, 18.9% in 
2009 and 62.7% in 2011. A post-evaluation study aimed at analysing the processes and 
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practices implemented in this and other good performers can be a valuable exercise to establish 
learning networks between courts and ultimately improve the efficiency of the Portuguese 
judicial system. This will be the subject of further research. 
The fact that the DEA technique provides the inefficient courts with specific targets they need 
to achieve to become efficient and indicates which courts they should use as references for 
learning and improvement, is a major advantage of this technique. The insights provided by the 
DEA in this specific example and context can be particularly rich because, contrarily to previous 
research, court cases were aggregated at the level of proceedings rather than at the level of 
procedures or procedural areas. This allows a more detailed guidance to courts and a more 
thorough analysis of each court’s strengths and weaknesses, especially when the information 
about the efficiency scores and targets is complemented with the information regarding the 
weight distribution.  
Despite the fact that the DEA model may yield alternative optimal solutions for the weights of 
the courts classified as efficient [53], the different optimal weights identified can still provide very 
useful information. For instance, the different optimal output weight profiles can be useful to 
identify different service delivery strategies. However, some care needs to be taken when 
interpreting these profiles as the weights might also be influenced by exogenous demand and 
by the restrictions imposed to account for the complexity of the different cases. 
 Table 4 synthesises the most relevant service delivery strategies identified in the 196 courts 
analysed in 2011.  
 
Table 4 – Virtual weights attributed by the courts to the different procedural areas in 2011 
 
Weight Profiles Procedural Area Average St Dev Maximum Minimum 
Group 1 
41 courts 
Civil Justice 100.0% 0% 100.0% 100.0% 
      
Group 2 
18 courts 
Civil Justice 
Criminal Justice 
76.1% 
23.9% 
13.9% 
13.9% 
99.9%  
40.3%  
59.7%  
0.1%  
      
Group 3 
5 courts 
Civil Justice 
Criminal Justice 
Family Justice  
78.7% 
9.4% 
11.9% 
15.5% 
6.6% 
8.7% 
95.5% 
17.9%   
22.4% 
59.8%   
2.2%  
2.3%   
      
Group 4 
122 courts 
Civil Justice 
Criminal Justice 
Family Justice 
78.0% 
15.6% 
6.4% 
9.5% 
7.5% 
3.2% 
99.0%   
30.7%    
14.5% 
59.9%    
0.7%    
0.07%    
      
Group 5 
1 courts 
Civil Justice 
Criminal Justice 
Family Justice 
43.1% 
47.8% 
9.1% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
43.1% 
47.8% 
9.1% 
43.1% 
47.8% 
9.1% 
      
Group 6 
8 courts 
Civil Justice 
Criminal Justice 
Labour Justice 
Family Justice 
69.4% 
15.8% 
4.3% 
10.5% 
13.9% 
7.4% 
4.7% 
4.5% 
94.6%    
26.8%  
13.7% 
15.5% 
53.8% 
1.3%   
0.06%   
2.5%    
      
Group 7 
1 courts 
Civil Justice 
Criminal Justice 
Labour Justice 
Labour-criminal justice 
Family Justice 
61.9% 
18.6% 
7.9% 
0.5% 
11.1% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
61.9% 
18.6% 
7.9% 
0.5% 
11.1% 
61.9% 
18.6% 
7.9% 
0.5% 
11.1% 
      
Total 
196 courts 
Civil Justice 
Criminal Justice 
Labour Justice 
Labour-criminal Justice 
Family Justice 
81.8% 
13.1% 
0.2% 
0.002% 
4.9% 
13.5% 
10.6% 
1.4% 
0.03% 
4.5% 
100.0%  
47.8%  
13.7%  
0.5%  
22.4% 
43.1%   
0%    
0%    
0%   
0%   
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As shown in Table 4, seven major different output weight profiles can be identified. Profile 1 
includes the courts of first instance which have placed all the output weight in the proceedings 
belonging to just one procedural area. In particular, the 41 courts belonging to this profile gave 
all the output weight to the civil justice procedural area suggesting that their productivity levels 
in solving civil cases are higher than in solving other types of cases, when compared to other 
courts. This might indicate that the civil cases are the most common in these courts and are 
those the courts’ workforces handle more frequently. Profile 2 includes 18 courts of first 
instance which have placed all the output weight in the proceedings belonging to only two 
procedural areas: civil justice and criminal justice. The average virtual weight given to the former 
was 76.1%, with the latter receiving an average virtual weight of 23.9%.  
Profiles 3, 4 and 5 are formed by courts which have distributed the virtual weight by three 
procedural areas: civil, criminal and family. There are, however, important differences in the 
service delivery strategies across these three profiles. For instance, the 5 first instance courts 
included in Profile 3 have given an equal or higher virtual weight to the family procedural area 
(average weight of 11.9%) than to the criminal procedural area (average weight of 9.4%). In 
contrast, the 122 courts included in Profile 4, the most common profile, have given a higher 
virtual weight to the criminal procedural area (average weight of 15.6%) than to the family 
procedural area (average weight of 6.4%). This suggests that the family cases are more 
common or are handled more efficiently by the former group, and that the criminal cases are 
more common or the ones handled more efficiently by the latter group. In both profiles the 
virtual weight given to the civil procedural area was at least 50% of the total output virtual 
weight, which indicates that when compared to other courts, the relative productivity of the 
judges and other staff in solving civil cases in these courts is higher than the productivity in 
solving the cases in the other two procedural areas put together. Profile 5 represents, however, 
a slightly different service delivery strategy and/or demand pattern. In this profile, the virtual 
weight given to the cases in the civil justice procedural area no longer represents 50 percent or 
more of the total weight. This is one of the two rarest profiles identified as it is formed by only 
one of the 196 courts assessed.  
Finally we have Profile 6 and 7. Profile 6 is formed by the 8 courts which distributed their 
virtual weights by four procedural areas. Only the labour-criminal procedural area was not 
included in the efficiency scores of these courts. Profile 7 includes the only court which has 
given weight to the five procedural areas. The contribution of the labour-criminal procedural 
area to the efficiency score of this court is, however, residual (0.5%). 
Regarding the contribution of the five procedural areas to the efficiency scores of the courts, 
civil justice has the largest contribution accounting for 81.8% of the average total score. 
Criminal justice is the second, and its contribution is 13.1% of the average total score. Family 
justice comes in third place with 4.9%. Finally labour justice and labour-criminal justice have the 
smallest contribution, accounting for only 0.2% and 0.002% of the average total efficiency score 
of the courts, respectively. The results for 2007 to 2010 are similar. The fact that the labour 
justice proceedings’ contribution to the efficiency scores of the courts assessed is very low is 
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not surprising as there are in Portugal specialised courts that handle this type of proceedings 
and therefore, the number of cases in this procedural area that are brought to first instance 
general jurisdiction courts, is very small.  
It is important to emphasise, however, that the fact that two different courts belong to the 
same profile regarding weight distribution by procedural area does not necessarily mean that 
they are following the same strategy in which the resolution of the different types of proceedings 
is concerned. For example, in 2011, both the Penelas’s court and the Valpaços’s court are 
inefficient and belong to Profile 1 in the sense that they are solving comparatively more cases in 
the civil area than in the other four procedural areas. This is indicated by the fact that in Figure 2 
both courts are giving all their virtual weight to proceedings belonging to the civil procedural 
area.  However, when we analyse their weight structure per type of proceeding, we clearly see 
remarkable differences between them. In particular, it is possible to verify that the proceedings 
that most contribute to the efficiency scores of each of the courts are different. For example, 
Figure 2 indicates that the productivity levels of the staff members in Penela’s court is 
considerably higher resolving proceedings O3 (common enforcement) than resolving 
proceedings O4 (Common enforcement < 15-Sep-2003) and O8 (inventory), as the virtual weight 
attributed to the former is considerably higher. 
 
Figure 2 – Virtual weight distribution of two courts by type of proceedings – Year 2011 
 
 
 
 
The decomposition of each court’s efficiency score in terms of the contribution of the 
different types of proceedings, as illustrated in Figure 2, is very important because it allows 
each court to identify its weak and strong areas and make the necessary improvements. For 
example, the court in Valpaços is best in resolving proceedings O4 (Common enforcement < 15-
Sep-2003) and O8 (inventory), whilst the court in Penela is best in resolving proceedings O3 
(Common enforcement) and O1 (Common civil declaratory actions). These courts are both 
classified as inefficient when compared with other courts with similar weight structures. For 
example, the benchmarks for Penela are: Évora, Felgueiras, Macedo de Cavaleiros and Serpa. 
These four courts achieve a score of 100% even when they experiment the optimal weight 
structure identified for Penela. In this respect, Penela should therefore undertake meetings with 
Virtual weight  
Proceeding types  
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these courts in order to learn about the structures and mechanisms which allow them to be 
efficient. In addition to this, the analysis of the weights by type of proceeding rather than by 
procedural area can also provide other useful information, as depicted in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3 – Virtual weight distribution of the courts by the 43 different proceeding types 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From the analysis of this figure, we can observe for example that the type of proceedings to 
which more courts have given weight in 2011 and which has the highest average virtual weight 
is the “common enforcement proceeding” (O3). The average contribution of this proceeding to 
the efficiency scores of the courts assessed in 2011 is 39.6% and 193 out of the 196 courts 
assessed have chosen to give a positive weight to this variable. The “inventory proceeding” (O8) 
was also chosen by a high number of courts. More specifically, there were only seven first 
instance courts in 2011 which did not take into consideration this type of proceeding in their 
efficiency scores, suggesting comparatively low resolution levels of this type of proceedings. It 
is interesting to note, however, that although most courts have chosen this variable, its average 
contribution to the efficiency score is much smaller than in the case of the “common 
enforcement proceedings”, as the “inventory proceeding” accounts of only 10.5% of the 
efficiency score of the courts in 2011. As Figure 3 illustrates, the contribution of each 
proceeding type to the efficiency scores of the courts in 2011 and the percentage of courts 
giving weight to each type of proceeding is also reflected in the other years as shown by the 
lines representing the average values for the period 2007 to 2011. The only differences worth 
mentioning are those related to proceedings O6, O21 and O30 where we can observe that the 
percentage of courts giving a positive weight to these proceedings in 2011 is considerably lower 
than those giving them a weight during 2007 to 2010. This is related with the fact that in 2011 
only 61 cases were finished and only 11 courts were involved in their resolution. The number of 
courts resolving these types of proceedings (and the number of cases finished) in the other 
years, particularly in 2007 and 2008, was much larger, which explains why more courts have 
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included them in their efficiency scores. Still, the number of cases finished in these proceedings 
when compared to others was low, and therefore the average weight they received was also 
low, as illustrated in Figure 3. 
Amongst the proceedings that most contributed to the efficiency scores of courts during 2007 
to 2011 are the “common enforcement proceeding” (O3), the “common civil declaratory actions” 
(O1) and the “common enforcement (< 15-Sep-2003)” (O4). On the opposite side, we have 
several types of proceedings which were selected by a very small number of courts and whose 
contribution to the efficiency scores of the courts assessed is only residual. This indicates that 
the productivity of the judges and support staff in resolving these types of proceedings is very 
low or that no lawsuits related with these proceedings were filed in these courts and, therefore, 
the courts ignore them in their efficiency scores. These proceedings include, for instance, 
“enforcement of foreign sentence” (O28), “European procedure of injunction” (O12) and 
“embargos” (O41). 
In the same way that different weight profiles were identified regarding dispute resolution, 
different weight profiles can also be identified regarding the composition of the workforce in the 
compared courts. In particular we can group the courts into 3 major input weight profiles as 
shown in Table 5, which uses data from 2011. The first profile includes 17 courts which have 
given all the virtual weight to the input variable judges, indicating that their levels of dispute 
resolution per judge when compared to the other courts are higher than the levels of dispute 
resolution per support staff. Then, we have a second profile, where the 45 courts that belong to 
it share the virtual weight between the two categories of staff but give a higher weight to the 
judges (i.e. 65.4% on average, against 34.6% of the weight given to the variable support staff). 
Finally, we have a third profile, which is the most common, where the weight is also shared 
between the judges and the support staff, but where the weight attributed to the latter (65.3%) is 
higher than the weight given to the former (34.7%).  
 
Table 5 – Virtual weights attributed by the courts to the different categories of staff – Year 2011 
 
Weight Profiles Staff categories Average St Dev Maximum Minimum 
Profile 1 
17 courts 
Judges 
Support Staff 
100.0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
100.0%   
0%   
100.0%   
0%   
      
Profile 2 
45 courts 
Judges 
Support Staff 
65.4% 
34.6% 
14.9% 
14.9% 
96.2%   
50.0%   
50.0%   
3.8%   
      
Profile 3 
134 courts 
Judges 
Support Staff 
34.7% 
65.3% 
8.9% 
8.9% 
49.7%   
78.6%   
21.4%   
50.3%   
      
Total 
Judges 
Support Staff 
47.4% 
52.6% 
23.1% 
23.1% 
100.0%   
78.6%   
21.4%   
0%   
 
A careful analysis of the DEA results for the period 2007 to 2011 suggests that the third 
profile represents the most efficient composition of the workforce as we obtained a statistically 
significant correlation between the efficiency scores of the courts and the composition of their 
staff, measured by the percentage of judges in the total workforce of each court. In particular, 
we used the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient, having obtained a correlation of -0.268 
(significant at the 0.01 level).  
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These results suggest that the performance of the courts where the proportion of the support 
staff in the total workforce is higher ranks generally higher than the performance of those courts 
where the proportion of the support staff is lower. Due to the relevance of this finding, in order to 
further test the hypothesis that courts with higher proportions of support staff in their workforces 
perform better, we implemented a Mann-Whitney U-test. The Mann-Whitney test is a 
nonparametric method which can be used to compare two groups of DMUs and evaluate if they 
come from a common efficiency distribution under the assumption of them sharing a common 
frontier. Rather than examining the means of the data, this method relies on the ranks of the 
scored values and the means of those ranks. Considering that this test does not impose a 
structure to the distribution of the DEA efficiency scores, it is a suitable statistical test to use in 
our context. For a thorough review of this test the reader is referred to Conover [54]. 
In order to perform the Mann-Whitney U-test, for each of the five years analysed, we divided 
the courts into two groups of similar size: group 1, including all the courts where the proportion 
of judges in the total workforce is lower than the median; and group 2, including all the courts 
where this proportion is higher than the median. We also set up the null hypothesis (H0) that 
assumes that the distributions of both groups are equal, so that the probability that a random 
efficiency score from one group is greater than a random efficiency score from another group is 
0.5. The results obtained with the statistical software SPSS are displayed in Table 6. 
 
Table 6 – Comparison of the efficiency results by workforce structure of courts  
using the Mann-Whitney U Test 
 
Year 2007  2008  2009  2010  2011 
Group 
Group 
1 
Group 
2 
 Group 
1 
Group 
2 
 Group 
1 
Group 
2 
 Group 
1 
Group 
2 
 Group 
1 
Group 
2 
Number of courts 
in group i 
105 106  104 104  97 98  88 79  86 88 
Average 
efficiency score  
of group i 
69.1% 54.9% 
 
74.9% 70.4% 
 
68.3% 60.8% 
 
78.1% 67.0% 
 
79.3% 70.0% 
               
Mean Rank 128.3 83.9  112.3 96.7  110.0 86.2  97.8 68.6  99.2 76.1 
U-Statistic 3220.5  4600  3592  2258  2779 
P-Value 0.000  0.062  0.003  0.000  0.002 
 
The results in Table 6 show that the mean rank of the courts belonging to group 1 is 
considerably higher than the mean rank of the courts belonging to group 2, suggesting that the 
courts in the first group have the highest efficiency scores, on average. The test statistics as 
well as the asymptotic significance (2-tailed p-value < 0.01) for all but one of the five years, 
allow us to reject the null hypothesis and conclude that there is a statistically significant 
difference between the distribution of the efficiency scores of the two groups, with the courts 
with higher proportions of support staff in the total workforce displaying, on average, higher 
efficiency levels than the courts with higher proportions of judges. The only exception is for year 
2008. For this year, although the average efficiency score of the courts in group 1 is higher than 
the one in group 2, and although the mean rank is also higher in the former group, the 
differences are not statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
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In order to explore some of the structures and mechanisms behind the variation in 
performance across the country, and address our second objective of determining the extent to 
which the Government’s decision to close down some courts can generate efficiency gains, we 
have also analysed the results by grouping the courts by size, as suggested by Santos et al. 
[10]. In this respect, and recognising that most of the courts the Government is planning to close 
on the grounds that they are too small have less than 500 new incoming cases, we have formed 
two groups: Group 1, including all the courts with less than 500 new incoming cases per year 
and Group 2 including all the courts with 500 or more new incoming cases per year.  
 
Table 7 – Analysis of the efficiency results by size of courts 
 
 
 Group 1 
< 500 cases 
Group 2 
≥ 500 cases 
Year    PTE(1) SE(2)     PTE SE 
 Number of courts in group i 55 158 
 
Number (and percentage) of 
efficient courts in group i  
1(1.8%) 13(8.2%) 
2007 Average efficiency 55.4% 56.4% 64.2% 84.7% 
 St Dev 18.5% 10.7% 19.2% 13.6% 
 Max 100.0% 80.8% 100.0% 100.0% 
 Min 12.7% 31.8% 26.4% 56.3% 
    
 Number of courts in group i 62 149 
 
Number (and percentage) of 
efficient courts in group i  
4(6.5%) 19(12.8%) 
2008 Average 66.9% 69.2% 75.0% 94.1% 
 St Dev 17.0% 8.9% 16.4% 8.0% 
 Max 100.0% 85.2% 100.0% 100.0% 
 Min 31.42% 52.0% 32.1% 72.5% 
    
 Number of courts in group i 51 146 
 
Number (and percentage) of 
efficient courts in group i  
4(7.8%) 18(12.3%) 
2009 Average 57.4% 70.7% 67.2% 90.2% 
 St Dev 22.0% 18.1% 17.9% 8.4% 
 Max 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 Min 21.1% 37.0% 33.5% 36.7% 
    
 Number of courts in group i 49 142 
 
Number (and percentage) of 
efficient courts in group i  
5(10.2%) 23(16.2%) 
2010 Average 63.1% 71.0% 76.4% 92.9% 
 St Dev 19.5% 11.5% 16.7% 8.2% 
 Max 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 Min 24.0% 40.9% 34.3% 61.6% 
    
 Number of courts in group i 49 147 
 
Number (and percentage) of 
efficient courts in group i 
9(18.4%) 21(14.3%) 
2011 Average 65.9% 67.2% 76.2% 91.2% 
 St Dev 23.6% 13.4% 17.4% 9.5% 
 Max 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 Min 30.4% 41.6% 35.6% 62.4% 
                                          1PTE: Pure Technical Efficiency; 2SE: Scale Efficiency. 
 
 
As the results on Table 7 suggest, the size of the courts seems to have some influence on 
the efficiency of the Portuguese judicial system. If we compare the average efficiency scores 
obtained from 2007 to 2011 by the courts in each of the two groups, we can verify that the 
scores of group 1 are considerably lower than those achieved by group 2. For instance, in 2011, 
the average efficiency score of courts with less than 500 new cases is 65.9% and this average 
increases to 76.2% in courts with 500 or more new incoming cases. This is an interesting 
finding. However, considering that a simple comparison between the two groups based on 
average efficiency scores does not have statistical validity as the theoretical distribution of the 
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DEA efficiency scores is unknown, to statistically analyse the existence of a size effect on the 
efficiency of the courts we followed a two-step process. Firstly, we used the Spearman’s rank 
correlation coefficient, to check for the existence of a statistically significant correlation between 
the efficiency scores of the courts and their size, measured by the number of new incoming 
cases per year. We obtained a correlation of 0.213 (significant at the 0.01 level). Secondly, and 
in order to complement our analysis, we used the Mann–Whitney U-test to compare the two 
groups in each of the five years assessed. The results of the Mann–Whitney U-test are shown 
in Table 8. 
 
 
Table 8 - Comparison of the efficiency results by size of courts using the Mann-Whitney U Test 
 
Year 2007  2008  2009  2010  2011 
Group 
Group 
1 
Group 
2 
 Group 
1 
Group 
2 
 Group 
1 
Group 
2 
 Group 
1 
Group 
2 
 Group 
1 
Group 
2 
Number of courts 
in group i 55 158 
 
62 149 
 
51 146 
 
49 142 
 
49 147 
Average 
efficiency score  
of group i 
55.4% 64.2%  66.9% 75.0%  57.4% 67.2%  63.1% 76.4%  65.9% 76.2% 
               
Mean Rank 86.12 114.27  84.56 114.92  77.65 106.46  66.87 106.05  77.05 104.98 
U-Statistic 3196.5  3290  2634  2051.5  2648.5 
P-Value 0.004  0.001  0.002  0.000  0.005 
 
The Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient, together with the results displayed in Table 8 
allow us to conclude that smaller first instance courts display, on average, smaller efficiency 
scores than larger ones. The results of the Mann-Whitney test indicate that the U-statistic is 
significant at the 1 percent level in each of the five years analysed. This allows us to reject the 
null hypothesis that states that there is no difference in the distributions of the technical 
efficiency scores across the two different size categories of courts. These results, therefore, 
suggest that statistically significant differences exist among the efficiency scores of the two 
groups of courts, confirming that the smaller courts (group 1) have the lowest average efficiency 
scores and the larger courts (group 2) the highest.  
In order to better understand the impact of courts’ size on the efficiency scores, we have also 
calculated a measure of scale efficiency (please refer back to Table 7). Our scale analysis 
confirms that there is a significant amount of scale inefficiency in this sector. For example, in 
2011, the average scale efficiency was 85.2% with almost 90% of the courts assessed (i.e. 176 
out of 196 courts) being smaller than optimal. Furthermore, as illustrated in Table 7, the smaller 
courts tend to present the lowest scale efficiency scores. For example, in 2011 the average 
scale efficiency of the courts with less than 500 new incoming cases was 67.2% and the one of 
the courts with 500 or more new incoming cases was 91.2%. Similar conclusions are reached 
for the other four years. This is a relevant finding and it corroborates the results of previous 
research as  Kittelsen and Førsund [33], in analysing the efficiency of the district courts in 
Norway, also found that most of the inefficiency was scale inefficiency with inefficient courts 
being, on average, smaller than optimal. 
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In addition, the results indicate that all but one of the courts the Government is planning to 
close and which we have considered in our analysis are operating under increasing returns to 
scale suggesting that efficiency gains could be achieved if these courts operated at a higher 
scale. Thus, combining the management of the caseloads of these courts with others may lead 
to efficiency increases in resource utilisation. 
These results, together with the fact that the average scale efficiency scores of the smaller 
courts assessed during the period of 2007 to 2011 are low (please see Table 7) suggest that a 
geographical reorganisation of the system could lead to greater efficiency and that some of the 
measures planned by the Government might be well targeted. In implementing these measures 
it is important to bear in mind that the scale of operations does not impact the efficiency of all 
the first instance courts in the same way. In particular, and using the results of 2011 for 
illustration, we can identify four distinct groups of courts. The first group is formed by 8 efficient 
courts that are operating at an optimal scale (e.g. Fafe, Leiria and Maia). The second group 
includes the remaining 22 efficient courts. Although these are technically efficient courts, the 
results show that they are operating at a sub-optimal size. All of them are operating under 
increasing returns to scale (e.g. Almeirim, Cadaval and Mira). Then, we have a third group, 
which includes 107 inefficient courts and where scale plays a role to a greater (e.g. Fronteira, 
Moimenta da Beira and Paredes de Coura) or lesser extent (e.g. Mirandela, Sesimbra and 
Resende) in explaining their inefficiency levels. In particular, the results show that in 102 of 
these courts part of their inefficiency is due to the fact that their scale of operations is smaller 
than optimal (e.g. Cantanhede, Penacova and Soure), whilst in the other 5 it is larger than 
optimal (e.g. Cascais, V. N. Famalicão and Sta. Maria da Feira). Finally, we can identify a fourth 
group, including the remaining 59 inefficient courts where, contrarily to the previous group, scale 
plays a minimal or no role in explaining their inefficiency levels. These courts display scale 
efficiency scores of 95% or higher, indicating that they are operating at an ideal or near ideal 
size (e.g. Alentejo Litoral, Barcelos, Loulé and Santarém). These results suggest that these 
courts could benefit mostly from better case management, maintaining their size of operation. 
Furthermore, these are the courts that could benefit mostly from a benchmarking exercise 
targeted at identifying the best practices amongst the other courts and incorporating these in the 
day to day management of their cases. Our DEA analysis allows the identification of suitable 
learning peers to each of the inefficient courts, as well as targets for performance improvement. 
However, importantly, our DEA results also suggest that efficiency increases matching 
peers’ best practices are insufficient to sustainably reduce the prevailing judicial backlog and 
length of court proceedings in several courts. If we look at the three most recent years, we can 
verify that the 196 courts assessed in 2011, the 191 assessed in 2010 and the 197 assessed in 
2009 were able to resolve 322,079, 302,440 and 304,914 cases respectively. The analysis of 
the targets for each of the inefficient courts (including information about the slacks) reveals that 
an additional 133,588 cases could have been resolved in 2011, 108,000 in 2010 and 151,312 in 
2009 had these courts operated at the level of the best practices, contributing to a substantial 
reduction in the backlog of cases at the end of 2011, which amounted to more than 710,000 
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cases. When we carry out the analysis court by court, and compare the number of cases that 
could have been resolved had each court operated at the level of the best practices with the 
number of new cases that entered in each court, we realise, however, that for a substantial 
number of courts (i.e. 36 courts in 2011, 47 in 2010 and 37 in 2009) the current capacity does 
not seem enough for them to cope with the new incoming cases, let alone cope with the existing 
backlog of cases. This is also an important finding and it points to the need for increases in the 
courts’ capacity and/or major changes in the functioning of the Portuguese judicial system. 
Unless more staff are deployed to meet the increased demand for court services or 
mechanisms that promote dispute resolution outside the court system are implemented, some 
of the measures the Government is planning to implement as part of the reform of the 
Portuguese judicial system might not meet the expected results.    
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This research had a two-goal purpose. The first goal was to determine the extent to which the 
empirical evidence supports the public perception that the Portuguese judicial system is 
inefficient. The second goal was to determine whether the decision to close down small courts 
on the grounds that this will generate efficiency gains in the sector is also supported by 
empirical evidence. In order to address these two objectives, we used data from 2007 to 2011 
and proposed a DEA model which takes into account the heterogeneity of cases to a much 
greater extent than has been done previously.  
With regard to the first research objective, our results found a sector where there is 
considerable scope for efficiency improvement, with only 11.6% of the courts analysed during 
2007 to 2011 making on average an efficient use of their resources. This, together with the fact 
that the average efficiency score during this five-year period was 69.1% and that 53.9% of the 
courts assessed obtained efficiency scores below average, suggests that there is considerable 
scope for efficiency improvement in the sector. These results strongly corroborate citizens’ 
perception that the Portuguese judicial system is inefficient. The results suggest, however, that 
improvements have taken place in the past five years as the percentage of efficient courts 
increased from 6.6% in 2007, to 11.2% in 2009, and to 15.3% in 2011. In the same way, the 
average efficiency score increased from 62.0% in 2007 to 64.7% in 2009, reaching its highest 
value in 2011 (i.e. 73.6%). 
Although the results have shown that there are some courts that are efficient in relative 
terms, there are others (the great majority) which could benefit considerably from a 
benchmarking exercise in order to improve their relative efficiency. In some courts this problem 
seems to be mainly a technical efficiency problem (i.e case management problem), suggesting 
that case resolution could be improved maintaining the current level of resources. In other 
courts there is evidence of scale inefficiencies, suggesting that they could benefit from altering 
their scale of operation. Therefore, regarding our second research objective, considering that 
scale inefficiency seems to be impacting more significantly the smaller courts (i.e. courts with 
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less than 500 new incoming cases per year), the results suggest that as long as equity in the 
access to justice is not compromised, the measures proposed by the Portuguese Government 
to close down some smaller courts and transferring their caseloads to larger courts, are timely 
and well-targeted. In order to assess the impact of courts’ size on their efficiency levels, we 
implemented the Mann-Whitney test, having found evidence suggesting that the average 
efficiency scores of the smaller courts are lower than the average efficiency scores of the larger 
courts. 
However, our analysis and results also suggest that efficiency increases matching peers’ 
best practices are not enough to sustainably reduce the prevailing judicial backlog and length of 
court proceedings in a considerable number of courts. In particular, our analysis indicates that 
there is not enough court capacity to deal with all the incoming cases in around 20% of the 
courts. Although increases in the different categories of staff are required, the results suggest 
that increases in support staff might have the highest impact on the performance of courts. As a 
consequence, unless major changes in the capacity and/or functioning of the Portuguese 
judicial system are implemented, the aimed efficiency increases might not be met with the 
desired success. 
By focusing on the most recent five years for which we had data available, the findings of this 
study represent an important insight into the efficiency of the Portuguese judicial system and 
are relevant and have implications to both researchers and policy makers. To researchers, the 
results we have discussed and the framework we have proposed to take into account the 
heterogeneity between cases and to ensure meaningful results, offer a number of avenues for 
further research and are potentially important for a large number of public agencies with 
heterogeneous services. 
 To policy makers, the study presents sound evidence that there is considerable potential for 
improvement in the sector and it can be an important catalyst for a deeper formative 
assessment aimed at performance enhancement. By identifying best practices and targets for 
improvement, the study points out those courts whose case management procedures ought to 
be investigated in order to develop sound strategies that can be replicated in the relatively 
poorer performers. In addition, the study discusses the extent to which the results of the DEA 
corroborate the views of the Government that operating at a larger scale would be more 
productive, pointing out, however, that the desired efficiency increases are likely to be 
unsuccessful unless changes in capacity or in the functioning of the judicial system are also 
implemented. Overall, this paper makes a relevant contribution to the body of knowledge on the 
use of DEA in this under-researched area.  
Although our results are robust and provide useful information for both researchers and 
practitioners, this is an exploratory study and, therefore, the results need to be interpreted with 
care. In addition to the variables used in our analysis, there are several others which can also 
play an important role in explaining judicial efficiency, and which might need to be taken into 
account in order to better understand the results obtained. Factors such as exogenous demand, 
technology available, number of defendants involved in each case, complexity of cases within a 
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particular type of proceeding and socio-economic variables in each county, amongst others, 
may also help explain some of the results obtained, and will be the subject of further research. 
Furthermore, it is important to bear in mind that DEA assesses relative rather than absolute 
efficiency. Therefore the efficiency measures derived only reflect how efficient courts are 
relative to others in the sample analysed. 
Future research should also explore the impact of the reforms that have been introduced in 
the Portuguese judicial system over the years. In particular, the use of total factor productivity 
analysis by means of the Malmquist Productivity Index [55] can provide useful insights to 
evaluate whether progress or regress in the efficiency and in the frontier technology has taken 
place.  
As part of a strategy to use the DEA technique in a formative mode, characterised by an 
effort to involve decision makers and to provide useful information for organisational 
management and improvement, it is our objective to undertake some case studies in order to 
explore in depth the reasons behind the performance results of some courts. The ultimate goal 
is to understand and document best practices so that they can be disseminated and replicated. 
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Appendix A 
 
Table A.1 – Different types of proceedings and their average duration in 2011 
 
Procedural Area Type of procedure Type of proceeding 
Average 
duration of 
proceeding i 
(in months) 
Civil Justice 
Declaratory actions 
O1 Common 20 
O2 Declaratory action (DL.108/2006)  10 
Civil enforcement actions 
O3 Common enforcement  33 
O4 Common enforcement (before 15th September 2003)  100 
O5 Special enforcement  34 
O6 Enforcement of pecuniary obligation  73 
Special actions 
O7 Divorce and separation  11 
O8 Inventory 43 
O9 Corporate reorganisation/bankruptcy  3 
O10 Other special actions  16 
Provisional orders O11 Interim means of protection  6 
Others 
O12 European procedure of injunction 6 
O13 Embargos 18 
O14 Qualification heirs  15 
O15 Fiscal foreclosure (claiming credits) 12 
O16 Service judicial notice  2 
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O17 Other non-specified proceedings 11 
Criminal Justice 
Criminal procedures (trial stage) 
O18 Common 13 
O19 Special proceeding  2 
 
Misdemeanours/Transgressions 
 
O20 Misdemeanour  13 
O21 Transgression  79 
Others 
O22 Legal accumulation  7 
O23 Bail (art.º 197.º CPP)  40 
O24 Economic bail (art.º 227.º) 25 
O25 Questioning aliens 3 
O26 Judicial expulsion (DL 244/98) 2 
O27 Hospitalization order (judicial confirmation)  1 
O28 Enforcement foreign sentence 6 
O29 Habeas Corpus  9 
O30 Good conduct bond 48 
O31 Banking secrecy breach incident 7 
O32 Enforcement accessory penalty 0 
O33 Hospitalization order 4 
O34 Third party rights incident (DL15/93) 16 
O35 Other non-specified proceedings  17 
Labour Justice 
Declaratory actions O36 Common 13 
Civil enforcement actions O37 Labour enforcement 41 
Special actions 
O38 Work accident/Occupational disease  11 
O39 Other special actions 5 
Provisional orders O40 Interim means of protection 7 
Others O41 Embargos 20 
Labour criminal 
justice 
Misdemeanours/Transgressions O42 Misdemeanours 6 
Family Justice Juvenile procedures O43 Non-specified proceedings*  13 
* In the procedural area of Family Justice there were three different types of proceedings. However, there was data regarding the 
average duration of resolution for only one of these types of proceedings. Because this type of proceeding was the most representative 
amongst the three, accounting for more than 85% of the cases resolved in this procedural area, we decided to aggregate the data and 
assume the average duration of this type of proceeding. 
 
 
Appendix B 
 
Restrictions imposed on the DEA model: 
 
  (1) u4 – u21  ≥ 0; 
  (2) u21 – u6  ≥ 0; 
  (3) u6 – u30  ≥ 0; 
  (4) u30 – u8  ≥ 0; 
  (5) u8 – u37  ≥ 0; 
  (6) u37 – u23  ≥ 0; 
  (7) u23 – u5  ≥ 0; 
  (8) u5 – u3  ≥0; 
  (9) u3 – u24  ≥ 0; 
(10) u24 – u1  ≥ 0; 
(11) u1 – u41  = 0; 
(12) u41 – u13  ≥ 0; 
 (13) u13 – u35  ≥ 0; 
(14) u35 – u10  ≥ 0; 
(15) u10 – u34  = 0; 
(16) u34 – u14  ≥ 0; 
(17) u14 – u18  ≥ 0; 
(18) u18 – u20  = 0; 
(19) u20 – u36  = 0; 
(20) u36 – u43  = 0; 
(21) u43 – u15  ≥ 0; 
(22) u15 – u7  ≥ 0; 
(23) u7 – u17  = 0; 
(24) u17 – u38  = 0; 
(25) u38 – u2  ≥ 0; 
(26) u2 – u29  ≥ 0; 
(27) u29 – u22  ≥ 0; 
(28) u22 – u31  = 0; 
(29) u31 – u40  = 0; 
(30) u40 – u11  ≥ 0; 
(31) u11 – u12  = 0; 
(32) u12 – u28  = 0; 
(33) u28 – u42  = 0; 
(34) u42 – u39  ≥ 0; 
(35) u39 – u33  ≥ 0; 
(36) u33 – u9  ≥ 0; 
(37) u9 – u25  = 0; 
(38) u25 – u16  ≥ 0; 
(39) u16 – u19  = 0; 
(40) u19 – u26  = 0;  
(41) u26 – u27  ≥ 0;  
(42) u27 – u32  ≥ 0;  
(43) v1 – v2 ≥ 0. 
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